

operational history the authors too easily digress. For example, they devote almost three pages to a plan, which was never used, to rescue the downed CIA pilot Allen Pope from a Jakarta prison via the recently invented Skyhook (pp.162–5). This story, like many others, appears to have been included primarily because it is an interesting aside. Not only is there little in the way of critical or sustained analysis of covert operations in 1957 and 1958, but the book never really tells us much of significance about the wider Cold War context in Indonesia and the United States in which the covert operations were launched and carried out.

Conboy and Morrison's book compares unfavourably to *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*, which was first published in 1995, and was written by Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin. The Kahins' book is a work of sustained analysis, thoroughly grounded in interviews (conducted in the US and Indonesia between the late 1950s and the early 1990s) and declassified US government material.

Regardless of whether or not one shares the politico-intellectual outlook of *Subversion as Foreign Policy*, it provides a model for the study of CIA activity in Indonesia in the 1950s and an exemplar for the excavation of the history of covert operations more generally. For readers interested in a deeper understanding of CIA activity in Indonesia in the late 1950s Conboy and Morrison's book has little to offer, and it certainly does not improve on the Kahins' earlier study of these events.

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Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000). Pp.xx + 264, 3 maps, 15 photos, notes, biblio., index. \$34.95. ISBN 0-89096-969-8.

This history of Okinawa falls short of the promise of its title but still offers a useful account of the period from the invasion of 1945 to the reversion of 1972. A more accurate title for *Keystone* would be something like 'Reversion: Washington's Decision to Forego Outright Occupation for the Indefinite Retention of Military Bases in Okinawa.'

The author, an assistant professor at Texas A&M University, mined mountains of government memoranda, official accounts, oral histories and secondary sources at scattered archives and libraries throughout the United States. He has used his findings to construct a straightforward story of Okinawa's reversion.

Following the first chapter, a familiar account of the battle for Okinawa in 1945, and two subsequent chapters on Okinawa's early administration, the book largely recounts the wrangling in Washington and Japan between US military officers and civilian officials. While fear of a renewed Japanese military threat largely disappeared early in the Cold War, many American officers and officials viewed Tokyo as an uncertain ally. In the event of a major crisis with Moscow or Beijing, would resumed Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa result in the restricted use, or even outright loss, of the extensive bases there?

The generals and diplomats differed in their response to the increasing calls for reversion in Okinawa and Tokyo. Officers, tasked with preparing their forces for the next war, strongly opposed surrendering the island chain. Civilians, on the other hand,

feared that holding on to Japan's sundered prefecture would gravely damage the overall relationship with Tokyo. In any event, they reasoned, the bases were inoperable without local acquiescence. In the end, Washington reached an accord with Tokyo that returned the prefecture to Japan while permitting the Pentagon to retain the bases built over nearly 30 years of occupation.

While the book's subtitle promises the reader an account of US-Japan relations in light of the US military occupation of the prefecture, the author offers only half a loaf. As he admits in his introduction, the book is not 'a comprehensive study', but 'primarily a study of US foreign policy'. Moreover, it is an examination of foreign policy at the highest levels. There is relatively little on policy as implemented in Okinawa. Hence, while the author touches briefly on the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, he offers no sustained account of Okinawa as a rear base in the Cold War.

He also pays little attention to intelligence. Missing are the US Army's Counter Intelligence Corps, the US Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and other intelligence organs that worked to secure the bases, monitor political developments, and convince Okinawans that occupation was a better deal than a return to Japan.

The Japanese, too, are nearly absent from the book. This is just as well, since the author cites no significant Japanese sources of information in his notes, except for one or two translated works.

However, the monolingual, one-sided approach weakens even his account of US policymaking. Consulting the six-volume published journal of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, President Richard Nixon's counterpart in the story's final chapter, would doubtless shed valuable light on Washington's approach to the negotiations. Worthy information also awaits exploitation in the memoirs of such players as Yara Choby, chief executive in occupied Okinawa, and Senaga Kamejiro, the popularly elected mayor of Naha whom the US authorities drove from office for his leftist views.

On the plus side, the author offers a detailed account of Okinawa's reversion as seen from Washington. The book is recommended for those seeking basic information on the key American players and their views on returning the island bastion to Japan. Readers seeking a comprehensive account of Okinawa's place in bilateral US-Japan relations, however, will have to wait.

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Chris Pocock, *The U-2 Spyplane: Toward the Unknown: A New History of the Early Years* (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2000). Pp.288, 110 b/w and colour photos. \$29.95/\$24.95. ISBN 0-7643-1113-1.

The downing of Francis Gary Powers and his U-2 over the Soviet Union in 1960, one of the Cold War's most notorious episodes, continues to fascinate. Thus to the already formidable list of books on the subject, including his own *Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane* (1989), Chris Pocock has added this volume.

Pocock traces the U-2 program from its inception through Powers' shootdown, Moscow show trial, and release in a 1962 spy-swap. The author describes, in great detail, the trials and tribulations of the aircraft's development, deployment and missions over the Soviet Union and other targets. It is here that the author makes his greatest contribution: using the most recent materials, including the CIA's own declassified history, as well as his own interviews with numerous program